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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In three separate, unrelated cases (Nos. 37767, 38051, and 38078), Amber
Stewart was charged with, and convicted of, a number of offenses . All three cases
have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. In this consolidated appeal, however,
Ms. Stewart asserts an issue arising from only one of her cases, No. 37767; she waives
all appellate issues stemming from the other two cases (Nos. 38051 and 38078).
In No. 37767, Ms. Stewart was charged with possession of methamphetamine
with the intent to deliver, a felony, and driving without privileges and possession of
marijuana, both misdemeanors.

She filed a suppression motion, asserting that the

search of her vehicle (which yielded the methamphetamine and marijuana that she was
ultimately charged with possessing) was an unconstitutional warrantless search;
however, that motion was denied based on the theory that the search in question was a
proper "inventory" search attendant to the impoundment of her vehicle.

Thereafter,

Ms. Stewart entered into a conditional plea agreement, whereby she specifically
preserved her right to appeal the district court's denial of her suppression motion.
On appeal, Ms . Stewart asserts that the district court erred in denying her
suppression motion .

Specifically, she contends that the "inventory" search of her

vehicle violated her Fourth Amendment rights because it was not conducted in
conformance with police department policy.
In response, the State offers a number of arguments . First, the State claims that
an inventory search need not be conducted in conformance with any standardized
police impoundmenl/inventory policy, so long as it is objectively reasonable under the
circumstances . (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9.) Second, relying on a non-existent
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finding by the district court, the State argues that the impoundmenl/inventory search of
Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) Third, and
apparently as an alternative to its first two arguments, the State asserts that the police
in this case did act consistently with departmental policy. (Respondent's Brief. pp .9-12 .)
The present Reply Brief is necessary to clarify both the law and the facts, and to
explain why the State's arguments are without merit.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in
Ms . Stewart's Appellant's Brief and, thus, should not need to be repeated herein.
However, because the State has presented a misleading picture of the facts of this
case, two points of clarification are required herein.
In i1s Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Officer Leon Dennis, the Garden
City Police Department ("GCPD") officer who pulled Ms. Stewart over, arrested her, and
impounded and searched her vehicle, made the decision to impound her automobile
because otherwise that car would have been left unsecured. (Respondent's Brief, p.7
("Because her car would be left unattended and unsecured in the middle of the night in
what tile officer testified was a high crime area, Officer Dennis decided to impound it.") .)
Further, in a similar vein, the State claims that the district court found, as a factual
matter, that Ms. Stewart's vehicle would have been left "unsecured" if it had not been
towed by the police, and that the impoundment, therefore, was undertaken in
compliance with GCPD policy. (See Respondent's Brief, p.4 ("Specifically, it [the district
courtJ found that Officer Dennis's decision to impound Stewart's car after arresting her
was reasonable and complied with GCPD's policies because Stewart was uninsured
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and her car would be left unsecured."), p.10 ("In this case, the district court found that
Officer Dennis impounded Stewart's vehicle, not as a 'backdoor approach in a narcotics
investigation,' but in accordance with GCPD criteria, because the uninsured's car would
be left unsecured. . . . Stewart has not established clear error in the district court's
factual findings."), p.11 ("As discussed above, Stewart was taken into custody for driving
without privileges, and the district court found that her vehicle would be left unsecured.")
(citations omitted), p.12 ("The district court correctly found that his decision to impound
the vehicle complied with GCPD's general guidelines. The district court also correctly
found that Officer Dennis's inventory complied with GCPO's standard procedures .... "):

see also

Respondent's Brief, p.11 ("The district court implicitly found that Stewart's car

would be left unsecured.").) Both of these claims by the State are, at best, misleading.
First, although Officer Dennis testified that he "l:c]ertainly" has "concerns" about
"leav[ing] a vehicle unattended" because there is a "potential for theft or things like that"
and, in this case. Ms. Stewart's car would have been left in what was supposedly a
"high-crime area," he never said that he impounded her car because it would have been
left unsecured. (See Tr., p. 74, Ls.1-8.) As was explained in Ms. Stewart's Appellant's
Brief (p.3), Officer Dennis testified only that it is his objective to tow as many of his
arrestees' vehicles as possible because "[i]t's just simpler that way." (Tr., p.72, Ls.16 20, p. 79, L.6 - p.80, L.15.)

Further, as was also pointed out in Ms. Stewart's

Appellant's Brief (pp.3-4), a concern that Ms. Stewart's vehicle would be left unsecured
was only one of three arguable considerations taken into account by Officer Dennis in
impounding the vehicle (the other two being that the vehicle itself was not insured and
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that the vehicle may have been impeding business at the gas station where it was
parked). (See Tr., p.72, L.16- p.74, L.8, p.79, Ls.6-9.)
Second, contrary to the State's claim, the district court made no finding that
Ms. Stewart's vehicle would have been "unsecured" had it not been impounded, or that
the impoundment or search in this case complied with GCPD policy.

(See generally

R., pp.30-37 (district court's entire order denying suppression motion).)

Rather, the

district court's factual findings on this matter were as follows:
The Defendant testified that her friend was insured and able to drive the
Defendant's car, despite the car being uninsured. However, the offices
did not allow the friends to assist in taking the vehicle. On this issue,
Officer Dennis testified that he chose to tow the vehicle because it was
permitted under the policy, where there was an arrest made. In addition,
Officer Dennis testified that he made the decision based on the lack of
insurance [on the vehicle itself], and the location of the vehicle. Officer
Dennis testified that he usually requests a tow when the policy allows, that
it is easier than dealing with the alternatives, and that in 80% of his arrests
involving a vehicle, the vehicle is towed.
(R., p.33.) Later, in upholding the impoundment and search, the district court based its
decision on what it perceived to be the reasonableness of GCPD's impoundment policy,
as well as a conclusory statement as to what it perceived to be the general
reasonableness of the officers' actions in this case. The district court stated as follows:
Garden City Police Department Procedure 4.608.2(2)(C) authorizes an
officer to impound a vehicle when the driver has been taken into custody
and the vehicle is left unsecured.
Garden City Police Department
Procedure 4.608.3(1)(c) requires officer[s] to perform an inventory search,
including glove compartments, unlocked container, and the trunk.
Officer Dennis testified that he made the decision to tow the vehicle
pursuant to these policies and procedures. In addition, Officer Dennis
testified that it is his usual practice to tow a vehicle after an arrest,
because it is easier for him. In this instance the officers were under no
obligation to trust any alleged representations of the Defendant's friends,
that they had valid insurance to take \awful possession of the vehicle. The
Court finds this policy and procedure reasonable and legitimate. There is
no indication that these policies were employed as a back-door approach
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in a narcotics investigation. Indeed, they had existed since 1987 and were
last revised in December of 2003, well before Gant1 was decided in 2009.
It cannot be seriously argued they were put in place to circumvent the
decision in that case. Further, Officer Dennis testified that, had his
concerns been interdiction of illicit substances, he would have requested a
drug dog.
The Court finds the impoundment and search objectively
reasonable under all the circumstances known to the police when the
decision to impound was made. Accordingly, the inventory search is valid
and the evidence obtained therefrom will not be suppressed.
(R., pp.36-37.) If anything, it appears from this passage that the district court upheld the
search in this case based on either the officers' desire not to be inconvenienced or their
distrust of Ms. Stewart's friends, not any concern that the vehicle would have been left
unsecured. (See R., pp.36-37.)

1

Arizona v. Gant,_ U.S._, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered through a
warrant\ess search of Ms. Stewart's vehicle?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Suppress Evidence Discovered Through A
Warrantless Search Of Ms. Stewart's Vehicle
In her Appellant's Brief, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976),

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990),
Ms. Stewart argued that inventory searches are only permissible insofar as they are
conducted pursuant to reasonable, standardized police department procedures for the
impoundment and inventorying of vehicles.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.)

She then

asserted that the search in her case was constitutionally impermissible because,
although GCPD has policies governing the impoundment and inventorying of vehicles,
the impoundment of her vehicle did not comply with those policies. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.12-15.) In particular, she argued that the State failed to show that the impoundment
was generally authorized under GCPD's policies and, even if the impoundment was
generally authorized, that Officer Dennis complied with policy by first obtaining Watch
Commander approval of the impoundment in this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-15.)
Finally, Ms. Stewart asserted that because the search of her vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment, the district court erred in failing to suppress the drugs found in that search
and the inculpatory statements made immediately afterward. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1516.)
In response, the State offers a number of arguments. First, the State claims that
an inventory search need not be conducted in conformance with any standardized
police impoundment/inventory policy, so long as it is objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 8-9.) Second, relying on a non-existent

finding by district court, the State argues that the impoundment/inventory search of
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Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.) Third, and
apparent!y as an alternative to its first two arguments, the State asserts that the police
in this case did act consistently with departmental policy. (Respondent's Brief. pp.9-12.)
For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of these arguments have merit.
The State's first argument is remarkable in that it both distorts Ms. Stewart's
argument on appeal and misstates the law.

The State claims that, in arguing that

inventory searches are only valid insofar as the impoundment and inventory of the
vehicle in question are undertaken in compliance with police department policy,
Ms. Stewart

is

arguing

that

compliance

with

policy

Amendment['s] objective reasonableness" requirement.

"supersedes

the

Fourth

(Respondent's Brief, p.9

(emphasis added); accord Respondent's Brief, p.8 ("Stewart has misinterpreted the
caselaw to arrive at this erroneous legal standard which would have the effect of
elevating strict compliance with local department policies above the objective, universal
test of Fourth Amendment reasonableness to searches and seizures.").) This claim is
made as part of the State's contention that, when evaluating the propriety of a purported
inventory search, the only relevant inquiry is the exceptionally broad question of
whether the impoundment and inventorying of the vehicle was objectively reasonable
under the circumstances. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10, 12.)
!nitially, it should be pointed out that Ms. Stewart never argued that strict
compliance with department policies concerning the impoundment and inventorying of
vehicles "supersedes" the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. (See

generally Appellant's Brief.)

To the contrary, it should be quite apparent from

Ms. Stewart's discussion of general Fourth Amendment standards, as well as
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Opperman, supra, and its progeny, that the reasonableness or any given search is
always the key inquiry In resolving a suppression issue, but that When ihe State seeks

to justify a warrantless search under Jhe Inventory exceptJon to the warrant requrremenl
that search v11II only be found to be reasonable and, thus, oonsbtutionat. ii the State can
show that the impoundmont and subsequent search were conducted rn acoordance with
a reasonable. standardized police department policy (See Appellant's Brief. pp 10-12)
Furthermore, it Is simply incorrect for the Stale to suggest that When it oomes to
Inventory searches, compliance with a standardized department policy is essenllally
Irrelevant so tong as the impoundment and inventory search tS otherwise deemed
reasonable under the circumstances In Opperman, supra, the United States Supreme
Court specll1catty held that "inventories pursuant to standatd police procedure are
reasonable" and, thus, permissible under the Fourth Amendment Opperman, 428 US
al 372 (emphasis added)

In part, this holding was based on the Court's prior decrslon

In Cady v. Dombrowski, 41 3 U.S 433, 436 (1 973), wherein "(tlhe Court (hadl carefully
noted that the protective search (of an tmpOUnded vehicle) was carried out in
accordance with standard procedures in lhe IOCat pollce department, a factor rending 10
ensure that the intrusion would be limded In scope ro the extent necessary ro carry our
the caretaking function." Opperman. 428 U.S ar 374-75 (emphasis ,n original),) Years
later, in Bertine, supra, the Court again focused on compliance wilh srandardlzed
procedures, noting as follows: "We emphasize that, in this case, the tnal court found
!hat the Police Departmeru's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers
and the listing of their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to tho requirement

that Inventories be conducted 8CCCrding lo standardized criteria • Bertine, 479 U.S at
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374 n.6 (emphasis added).

It then went on to hold that officers did not violate the

Fourth Amendment just because they exercised discretion in impounding and
inventorying the defendant's vehicle; the Court held that such discretion is permissible
"so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria .... "2 Id. at 37576 (emphasis added).

Finally, in Wells, supra, the Supreme Court found that an

inventory search of a locked suitcase in the trunk of a vehicle was unreasonable and,
thus, unconstitutional because there was no department policy to address closed
containers in inventoried vehicles.

Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5. The Court reasoned that

"absent such a policy, the ... search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment .... " Id. at 5. In light of these authorities, it is absurd for the State to now
suggest that compliance with standardized procedures in impounding and inventorying
vehicles is essentially irrelevant, and that the only relevant question is whether the
officer(s) generally acted reasonably under the circumstances.
The State's second argument, i.e., that the impoundmenUinventory search of
Ms. Stewart's car was objectively reasonable in light of the ''finding" that the car would
have otherwise been left "unsecured," is no more compelling than its first argument. As
noted in the above Statement of Facts, the fundamental proposition upon which this
argument is based, i.e., the district court's "finding" that the car would have been
"unsecured" had it not been impounded is unsupportable. As noted, the district court
made no such finding. Nor could the district court have made such a finding. As was
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Notably, in Bertine, Justice Blackmun, speaking not only for himself, but also for
Justices Powell and O'Connor, "wr[o]te separately to underscore the importance of
having such inventories conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures."
Id. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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discussed in Ms. Stewart's Appellant's Brief (p.14), when Ms. Stewart was arrested, the
police obtained the keys to her vehicle, so it was easily locked, i.e., "secured." 3 (See
Ex. 1, Track B, at 06:09.)

Moreover, even if the district court had believed Officer

Dennis's claim that the vicinity of 37th St. and Chinden Blvd. is a "high-crime area"
generally (see Tr., p.74, Ls.4-8) and had made such a factual finding (which it did not
(see R., pp.30-37)), this fact alone would not support a conclusion that Ms. Stewart's
locked vehicle would have been "unsecured," especially since it was parked on the front
side of a business that was open 24 hours (Tr., p.73, Ls.1-11) and, therefore, was likely
located in a lighted area in full view of the public. Thus, it ought to be apparent that the
State failed to meet its burden of showing that the impoundment/inventory of
Ms. Stewart's vehicle was consistent with department policy, i.e., reasonable.
The State's third (and alternative) argument, i.e., that the police in this case acted
consistently with departmental policy, is also without merit. The State's initial assertion
is that Officer Dennis did not take the view that he has '"absolute, unfettered discretion
to impound and inventory the vehicle of everyone he arrests"' and impound
Ms. Stewart's vehicle on that basis but, rather, that he permissibly exercised discretion

3

The State's argument that locking a vehicle does not secure that vehicle because it
could still be subject to "property damage and theft, such as windows being smashed,
locks being jimmied, the ignition being hotwired, or the body being keyed"
(Respondent's Brief, p.10) is unavailing because it would require an absurd
interpretation of the GCPD policies. Under the State's reasoning, only an impounded
vehicle could be considered "secured" and, thus, not subject to impoundment. Stated
another way, the GCPD would allow for impoundment of any unimpounded vehicle at
any time; however, if this were the case, the whole of subsection (2) of Policy 4.608.2
(which carefully identifies the circumstances under which officers may cause vehicles to
be impounded) would be rendered mere surplusage. Furthermore, if the policy were to
be given such an interpretation, it would be too broad to "sufficiently regulate[ ]" police
conduct, Wefts, 495 U.S. at 5, and, thus, any impoundment/inventory conducted
thereunder would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
11

"according to standard criteria" "because the uninsured's car would be left unsecured."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.13).) The State's claims are
disproved, however, by the record.

Officer Dennis testified that his understanding of

GCPD was that "[w]henever we place someone under arrest, the vehicle can be towed."
(Tr., p.61, Ls.22-25; accord Tr., p.80, L.20 - p.82, L.13 (testifying that GCPD's policies
provide no criteria for towing a vehicle when its driver has been arrested).) Further, as
discussed above, Officer Dennis never testified, and the district court never found, that
Ms. Stewart's vehicle was impounded and searched in this case based on Officer
Dennis' concern that it would otherwise be "unsecured."
The State further contends, in wholly conclusory fashion, that Officer Dennis
complied with the requirement that he obtain Watch Commander approval of any
impoundments because he had "standing approval" from his Watch Commander to
have any vehicle impounded that he chose. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) However,
the State offers no argument as to how "standing approval" by one Watch Commander
for one particular patrol officer to exercise his discretion whoever he wishes satisfies the
requirement of GCPD's policies that, in every case, a Watch Commander sign off on
every impoundment (see Ex 82 §§ 4.608.2.2 & 4.608.3.1 ). or the United State's
Supreme Court's requirement that impoundments/inventories be conducted consistent
with policy so that the procedure for doing so is standardized across cases. See Wells,
495 U.S. at 4-5; Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6.

As was discussed in Ms. Stewart's

Appellant's Brief (p.p.14-15), when one Watch Commander relinquishes his supervisory
authority vis-a-vis one of his patrol officers, he creates a situation which invites

12

disparate treatment of suspects and, thus, non-standardized procedures governing the
impoundment/inventorying of the vehicles of GCPD arrestees.
In light of the foregoing, Ms. Stewart continues to assert that the impoundment
and search of her vehicle was not authorized under GCPD policy and, therefore, was
not reasonable and permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Stewart
requests that this Court vacate her convictions and sentences in Case No. 37767,
reverse the district court's order denying her suppression motion in that case, and
remand that case for further proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of September, 2011.
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